Northern Ireland's Past is an Active Crime Scene

Another week, another refusal by the National Archives to release public records into the public domain.

Every few weeks I submit a new FoI request to the National Archives relating to the Northern Ireland Troubles.

Most of the time these requests are knocked back.

I thought I’d explain to you, dear reader, a little more about the process so as to demystify one of the core activities at the heart of my research and writing.

Only a small percentage of ‘Public Records’ are made public. When it comes to those relating to the Northern Ireland Troubles, this is even smaller.

Let’s dive right in.

The most recent rebuttal from the National Archives was in relation to a document I wanted to access entitled: “The Stevens Inquiry (collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries).”

Some brief context: Lord Stevens, then deputy Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Constabulary and subsequently Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, was dispatched to Northern Ireland following the leakage of British intelligence documents into the hands of loyalist paramilitaries in 1989.

John Stevens, then Deputy Chief Constable at Cambridgeshire Constabulary, was dispatched to Northern Ireland to investigate the leaks of security force intelligence documents to the UDA/UFF, Belfast Newsletter, 18 September 1989.

The intelligence documents were mostly low-level with composite information gleaned from what were known as “P Files”, short information cards giving the names, addresses and other basic information about suspected “players” in the various terrorist organisations. Copies of these “P Files” found their way into the hands of members of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), namely Tommy Tucker Lyttle, the West Belfast Brigadier of the UDA, and his Intelligence Officer, Brian Nelson.

Nelson was subsequently discovered to have been working as an army agent for the shadowy Force Research Unit (FRU).

The Force Research Unit (FRU), publicly acknowledged by the British government as being an undercover collection agency for Military Intelligence during the Troubles.

While there has been a fair amount of formerly classified information already placed in the public domain via the review into the murder of Belfast solicitor Patrick Finucane by the UDA in February 1989, the British government continues to retain some files. Many of these are listed on the National Archives catalogue, accessible online.

The Labour government has recently announced the appointment of the Rt Hon Sir Gary Hickinbottom as Chair of the Patrick Finucane Inquiry, though the Terms of Reference for this public inquiry are yet to be established. As with other public inquiries set up in the past - e.g. into the deaths of Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson - there is every likelihood these and other files will be de-classified, albeit in redacted format.

Nevertheless, my recent attempt to have some of this information declassified is connected to research I have been doing for a new book entitled Enemies Within, which examines British intelligence operations against the West Belfast UDA.

A UDA/UFF Mural in West Belfast © Creative Commons

For the moment, I have been rebuffed under the very legislation that enabled me to apply to have the file released in the first place: The Freedom of Information Act 2000.

The letter from the National Archives FOI Team headlines with: “We are unable to open this document because all of the information is exempt under sections 23, 24, 31(1)(a)(b)(c), 38(1)(b), 40(2) and 41 of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000. This means that we cannot make the document open to you or to the public in general.”

In circumstances like this, the National Archives are legally bound to carry out a Public Interest Test - in consultation with the relevant government department (in this case the Ministry of Defence) to determine whether they can release material exempt under these clauses in the FoI Act.

They considered arguments in favour of disclosure/non-disclosure, concluding that it was not in the public interest for several reasons:

It is interesting to note that the arguments in favour of non-disclosure hinged on two grounds. First, that disclosure of the file would compromise the PSNI’s law enforcement abilities, presumably in their role of policing the past, and, second, that people - both security forces personnel and paramilitaries - remain at risk from terrorist reprisals, mainly from dissident republicans.

Northern Ireland’s past remains an active crime scene, preventing the disclosure of ‘public records’ to the public.

This is in line with the latest comments by PSNI Chief Constable John Boutcher, who issued a press release in October 2024 stating:

“The threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) in Northern Ireland is assessed by our security partners, not PSNI. This threat is wholly driven by violent Dissident Republicans and not by any group which supports the Belfast Good Friday Agreement. This threat is an ever-present reality for our officers, staff and their families as shown by the cowardly attempted murder last year of our colleague John Caldwell. The threat from NIRT remains SUBSTANTIAL meaning at any time an attack is likely.”

In other words, Northern Ireland’s security environment remains dynamic and threats emanating from historical crimes committed in the past are judged to be a high probability if information is intentionally or unintentionally released.

One important point to make, however, is that the FoI Act does not operate in a legal vacuum either. Under the UK Data Protection Act 2018, the disclosure of personal information about a third party is exempt.

All this being said, it is intriguing to read Mr Boutcher’s evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in April 2025 in which he complained of the role of lawyers in blocking pathways to information retrieval. In his words, ‘what we have done since the Good Friday agreement is try to put brick wall after brick wall in front of information provision, and it feels to me like the unilateral approach by the last Administration was a final high wall to stop information coming out.’

All in all, the idea of the “archives being thrown open” to the public, including professional researchers and historians, is unlikely ever to happen, at least not in the prevailing legal and security contexts.

This raises the question about what kind of information the so-called ‘official history project’ is likely to place in the public domain, especially once the process of “weeding” has taken place and the legal constraints have been applied.

What is needed, urgently, is a new form of what the Soviets called “glasnost” (openness), whereby the archives are thrown open in the most democratic way possible so that the sunlight can act as the best form of disinfectant.